Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Munipical Bonds Be Justified? by Galle, Brian D. & Yale, Ethan
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
October 2007
Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Munipical
Bonds Be Justified?
Brian D. Galle
Florida State Univ. College of Law, brian.galle@law.georgetown.edu
Ethan Yale
Georgetown University Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian D. Galle and Ethan Yale. "Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Munipical Bonds Be Justified?." Tax Notes 117, no.2 (2007):
153-.
Can Discriminatory State Taxation
Of Municipal Bonds Be Justified?
By Brian D. Galle and Ethan Yale
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Municipal Bonds Issued by States . . . . . . . . . . 154
Municipal Bonds Issued by Localities . . . . . . . 156
Prognostication and Foreboding . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Introduction
On November 5 the Supreme Court will hear argu-
ments on whether the state of Kentucky can constitution-
ally tax interest on federally tax-exempt bonds issued
outside the state while exempting tax bonds issued by
Kentucky and its political subdivisions. We describe that
arrangement (tendentiously, we admit) as ‘‘discrimina-
tory exemption,’’ to distinguish it from a tax exemption
for municipal bond interest that doesn’t shut off for
out-of-state municipal bonds, which we would consider
nondiscriminatory. We previously reported on the
broader constitutional issues raised by the case, which is
now calledDepartment of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis (No.
06-666).1 The petitioners and their amici have recently
filed their opening briefs defending the validity of the
Kentucky scheme. In this follow-up report, we focus on
an issue raised, but not thoroughly addressed, by those
briefs: Exactly what state interest justifies Kentucky’s
discriminatory exemption?
Our conclusion is that the case for a discriminatory tax
exemption for municipal bonds is exceedingly weak. If
Kentucky’s scheme is subject to anything other than the
most deferential scrutiny, it should fail. Naturally,
whether the Supreme Court will see things our way is an
entirely different question, one we take up briefly at the
end of this report in Section IV.
The petitioners offer several reasons for exempting
their own bonds from taxation, but the petitioners do not
describe what governmental interest might lie behind
Kentucky’s policy of taxing bonds issued by other states.
This omission is important because it is the discrimina-
tory quality of the exemption that is constitutionally
suspect: Accepting as thoroughly persuasive Kentucky’s
reasons for exempting in-state bonds from tax (which we
don’t) should be insufficient unless Kentucky can also
provide an adequate justification for taxing bonds issued
by other states. Perhaps the petitioners simply preferred
to reserve their arguments on this front for their reply
briefs.
But the more likely explanation is that there is no good
reason for the discriminatory exemption. For bonds is-
sued by the state itself, the only grounds for choosing
discriminatory over a nondiscriminatory exemption are
to induce Kentuckians to buy in-state bonds.2 This justi-
fication may sound more benign when cast in other ways
1Ethan Yale and Brian Galle, ‘‘Muni Bonds and the Dormant
Commerce Clause After United Haulers,’’ Tax Notes, June 11,
2007, p. 1037, Doc 2007-12884, 2007 TNT 113-46. Our earlier
report also includes a more complete description of the back-
ground of the litigation, including the workings of the munici-
pal bond market. Id. at 1037-1039.
2Unlike the petitioners, we would make an analytical dis-
tinction between state-issued bonds and those issued by politi-
cal subdivisions of the state. For example, the petitioners seem
to contend that the issuance of bonds by cities and counties
should count as market participation by the state itself, evi-
dently because the cities and counties are creatures of state law.
That begs the question: Private corporations, too, are wholly
Brian Galle is an assistant professor at the Florida
State University College of Law. He can be contacted
at bgalle@law.fsu.edu.
Ethan Yale is an associate professor at Georgetown
University Law Center. He can be contacted at
edy@law.georgetown.edu.
This report continues the authors’ analysis of De-
partment of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, a case sched-
uled for argument in the upcoming Supreme Court
term. The issue in Davis is the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s practice (shared by nearly all other states
with an income tax) of taxing interest on federally
exempt bonds issued outside the state while exempt-
ing its own municipal bonds from taxation. In this
report, they skeptically evaluate several possible state
interests that might be offered to justify that practice.
For example, they point out that Kentucky’s assertion
that the policy conserves state revenue is wrong. They
also argue that if the goal is to transfer revenues from
the state to local governments, exemption is inferior to
direct grants.
The authors have benefited in the preparation of
this report from helpful exchanges with Linda Beale,
Greg Germaine, Brad Joondeph, Gregg Polsky, Steve
Salop, Daniel Ray, and Lamar Taylor.
For the authors’ previous report, see Tax Notes, June
11, 2007, p. 1037, Doc 2007-12884, 2007 TNT 113-46.
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— for instance, Kentucky frames the argument as its
choice not to subsidize the projects and governments
financed by non-Kentucky municipal bonds3 — but any
way you look at it, the core of the argument remains the
same: The principal purpose and effect of Kentucky’s
discriminatory exemption is to retard interstate com-
merce in municipal bonds. Fostering economic Bal-
kanization — whether driven by the desire of state
officials to shield themselves from the consequences of
bad fiscal management, by tit-for-tat economic retaliation
among the states, or by other factors — is not a consti-
tutionally sufficient justification for discrimination.4
Kentucky has a stronger case when it comes to ex-
empting the bonds issued by Kentucky’s political subdi-
visions rather than by the state itself, because in the
former case exemption has the effect of transferring
revenue from state to local coffers. That transfer, how-
ever, comes at considerable cost, as we outline. We think
it is irrational, in light of far less costly but otherwise
identical alternatives, to choose exemption, and we do
not think the Court should accept it as legitimate grounds
for state action.
Municipal Bonds Issued by States
Turning first to the possible justifications for the
discriminatory exemption of state-issued bonds, the cen-
tral argument we find in the briefs is revenue.5 The briefs
recite at length the usefulness of bonds in leveraging state
resources and spreading the costs of public projects over
the lifetime of the project. The exemption, some amici
add, makes this borrowing more affordable for states.6
Moreover, discriminatory exemption makes borrowing
more affordable still, by ensuring that none of the tax
revenues foregone by the state will benefit other states’
bonds.
That rationale is incoherent because Kentucky’s deci-
sion to exempt its own bonds cannot increase its net
revenues, and is almost sure to decrease them. If we think
of the state tax exemption for interest from the state’s
own bond as a reduction in the state’s cost of borrowing,
the foregone tax revenues will always equal or exceed the
borrowing costs avoided. To see why, imagine that Ken-
tucky must borrow $100 and that the market rate for fully
taxable bonds of comparable risk is 8 percent. Suppose
further that Kentucky can sell all its bonds to a single
Kentucky taxpayer whose federal marginal tax rate is 25
percent, and that Kentucky’s marginal rate is 5 percent.
Thanks to the federal exemption, in an efficient market
Kentucky would be able to borrow from this taxpayer at
a 6 percent rate.7 If Kentucky taxes its own bonds, it will
pay $6 in interest this year, but collect $0.30 in tax ($6 x
.05), for a net cost of $5.70. Alternatively, Kentucky can
exempt its own bonds, and, again assuming the market is
efficient, its interest cost will drop to 5.7 percent.
Yet for reasons not fully understood by public finance
economists who have studied the question, neither the
federal nor the state income tax exemptions for municipal
bonds are fully impounded into their price (this is a
well-known phenomenon referred to as the ‘‘muni-bond
puzzle’’).8 One likely reason is that states sell at least
some of their bonds to buyers that aren’t in the top
marginal rate bracket. To illustrate, suppose that Ken-
tucky cannot meet all its borrowing needs by selling
bonds to taxpayers who are in its highest bracket, and
must also sell some bonds to those who are taxed at only
4 percent. To offer a competitive price to these buyers,
Kentucky must sell bonds (under the same assumptions
as in our last paragraph) at 5.76 percent because that is
the point at which those buyers are indifferent, after tax,
to Kentucky bonds and others.9 But there are still pur-
chasers with a 5 percent Kentucky marginal tax rate.
Those purchasers get a windfall of six basis points that
comes directly out of the Kentucky fisc. Unless Kentucky
is pursuing the regressive policy of aggrandizing high-
bracket Kentucky holders of its municipal bonds but not
lower-bracket holders, which no one has suggested,
Kentucky would be better off with no exemption at all.10
creations of state law. The relevant question is whether the
policies that underlie the dormant Commerce Clause, as well as
its exceptions, extend to locally issued bonds. Cf. Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 43-51 (1994) (holding that
political subdivisions of state were not necessarily entitled to
state’s sovereign immunity unless underlying rationale of sov-
ereign immunity doctrine would logically extend to subdivi-
sions as an ‘‘arm of the state’’). Thus, we think that the
constitutionality of discriminatory exemption of in-state bonds
issued by local governments must be justified on its own terms.
3Brief for Petitioners (hereinafter Pet. Br.) at 17-18.
4One justification for discrimination against out-of-state in-
terests — reserving Kentucky’s largesse for Kentuckians — has
support in the Court’s market participation cases, but to prevail
on this basis Kentucky would have to convince the Court that
the challenged tax law is a form of market participation. This
argument was considered and rejected by the Court in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, Doc
97-13802, 97 TNT 97-25 (1997). See Yale and Galle, supra note 1,
at 1040-1041.
5See, e.g., Pet. Br. at 23-24; Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association Brief (hereinafter SIFMA Br.) at 7.
6SIFMA Br. at 7.
7At 6 percent, the buyer is indifferent to the after-tax return
he receives from Kentucky and the after-tax return, .08 - (0.25 x
.08) he would receive on a fully taxable bond. This example
simplifies considerably from actual market pricing of bonds,
which is fairly complex. See National Federation of Municipal
Analysts Brief (hereinafter NFMA Br.) at 8-9. NFMA filed its
amicus brief in support of neither party.
8See John Chalmers, ‘‘Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni
Puzzle: Evidence From Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by
U.S. Treasury Obligations,’’ 22 Rev. Financial Stud. 281 (1998), for
a review of the economics literature on the muni-bond puzzle.
See also Calvin H. Johnson, ‘‘A Thermometer of the Tax System:
The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured by Implicit
Tax,’’ 56 SMU L. Rev. 13 (2003), for an intriguing argument that
the absence of full capitalization of the municipal bond tax
exemption into the price of bonds is evidence that investors
have too many easy alternative ways to avoid tax.
96 - (6 x .04) = $5.76. To make the example as simple as
possible, we assume that the Kentucky taxpayer with a 4
percent Kentucky marginal tax rate still has a 25 percent federal
marginal tax rate.
10Kentucky argues that ‘‘taxing interest income received by
Kentucky taxpayers on Kentucky bonds . . . might reasonably be
thought by the Kentucky General Assembly to be a zero sum
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When the state’s tax exemption is not fully impounded
into the price of its bonds, a tax on those bonds would
bring in more revenue than is conserved by the exemp-
tion.11
The situation is similar if some of Kentucky’s bonds
are held by nonresidents.12 If (as is currently the case in
all states with an income tax except Indiana) the foreign
state does not exempt from tax Kentucky-issued bonds,
then Kentucky will have to pay 6 percent interest to
compete in the foreign market.13 Alternatively, if the
foreign state has no income tax, Kentucky again will have
to pay market rate because the after-tax rate of return on
all states’ bonds, including the home state, will be
identical. Either way, all of Kentucky’s bondholders will
realize a substantial windfall at the state’s expense. If
Kentucky finds itself in this situation, then it takes a bath,
relative to simply choosing no exemption at all.
Consequently, the putative fiscal rationale for dis-
criminatory exemption quickly unravels. Discriminatory
exemption is said to reduce the amount of revenue a state
must forego to obtain the fiscal benefits of exempting its
own bonds. As we have just shown, however, there are no
meaningful fiscal benefits to the state’s decision to ex-
empt its bonds.14 This rationale should fail even rational
basis scrutiny.
Several amici offer a slightly different argument. They
claim that discriminatory exemption encourages the de-
velopment of mutual funds that invest only in the bonds
of a single state. Those single-state funds, in turn, sup-
posedly help smaller states to attract investors and
generate value from the specialized knowledge fund
managers and investors have about the public projects
and fiscal condition of the issuers.15
The premises of that argument are contradictory. If
local investors have superior information about the credit-
worthiness and other factors that influence the price of
local bonds, one would expect them to trade on that
information, just as hedge funds have exploited their
insights into market mistakes about firm value to reap
superior returns. Local investors should need no addi-
tional incentive to buy local bonds. Similarly, if fund
managers of state-specific bond funds develop valuable
expertise in the bonds held by their fund, they should be
able to command a premium for their services. State-
specific funds, under this logic, will continue to exist
regardless of whether there is discriminatory exemp-
tion.16 In any event, we simply do not believe the
unsubstantiated claim that ‘‘small’’ jurisdictions cannot
attract investment without state-specific funds. States
raised money from the bond market long before there
were state-specific funds.17
The amicus brief filed on behalf of the Government
Finance Officers Association et al. (GFOA) raises another
justification for the discriminatory exemption.18 Granting
select tax benefits to Kentucky residents, GFOA claims,
encourages Kentucky residents to become ‘‘personally
invested’’ in their state’s infrastructure, and to become
literal ‘‘stakeholders’’ in their commonwealth.19 Al-
though that sounds wonderful, the incentives of stake-
holders to take a free ride on the efforts of other
stakeholders is the same, whether the stake is as a voting
citizen or a bondholder, or both. For the average citizen
who will hold only a tiny fraction of all outstanding
bonds, there is no reason to believe that owning those
bonds will increase her participation in local govern-
ment.20 Moreover, as we just noted, there are already
ample incentives for residents to purchase local bonds,
regardless of tax advantage.
game: any additional revenue collected would be offset by
increased bond interest expense.’’ Pet. Br. at 23. This is true only
if the General Assembly is ignorant of the muni-bond puzzle,
which seems doubtful because the puzzle is common knowl-
edge. NFMA Br. at 9. (‘‘The reduction in borrowing costs
attributable to state tax exemption of municipal bond interest is
not fully commensurate with the potential state tax savings to
purchasers of such bonds.’’)
11It is possible that some taxpayers irrationally purchase
tax-exempt bonds — that is, they buy bonds that pay less after
tax than would taxable bonds. We are told by industry experts
that there is some anecdotal evidence of this practice, but that it
is not widespread. Cf. Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z1, tbl.
F.211 at p. 44, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/Current/z1r-3.pdf (noting that vast majority of
muni-bond holders are funds). It would take a very large
volume of irrational purchasers to overcome the negative rev-
enue effects we describe in this paragraph of the main text and
the next.
12This situation is common. NFMABr. at 9-12. (‘‘Demand for
bonds issued in a specific state from taxpayers within such state
may not be sufficient to absorb all bonds issued by such state’s
issuers. . . . The national market is the predominant market for
municipal bonds as a whole.’’)
13However, if the foreign state exempted interest on Ken-
tucky’s bonds, then Kentucky might incur little or no additional
cost, depending on the tax rate in the foreign state. Because this
would represent a fiscal transfer from that state to Kentucky, it
is unsurprising that states rarely adopt such a tax scheme. We
examine the details of these interrelationships in more detail
below.
14Kentucky is thus mistaken when it asserts, ‘‘It would make
no sense for Kentucky to tax its own interest payments to
bondholders as a means of raising revenue.’’ Pet. Br. at 29.
15SIFMA Br. at 13; Nuveen Br. at 13-15, 17-18; Aquila Br. at 8.
16One of the amici acknowledges, for instance, that there is a
state-specific Florida fund even though Florida has no income
tax. NFMA Br. at 14. Because of the value of diversification, it is
likely that, absent discriminatory exemption, most individual
investors would hold state-specific fund shares through a
fund-of-funds intermediary.
17Pet. Br. at 6 and n.8 (explaining that until a 1976 change to
the regulated investment company tax rules, single-state funds
were far less popular than they are today).
18The brief was filed on behalf of GFOA and eight other
organizations, including the National Governors Association
and the National League of Cities.
19GFOA Br. at 25-26.
20Cf. Robert Clark, Corporate Law 390-396 (1986) (explaining
rational ignorance of individual corporate shareholders). To be
sure, large bond funds may overcome this problem. See John C.
Coffee Jr., ‘‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor
as Corporate Monitor,’’ 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1285 n.23 (1991).
But fund manager efforts to protect the fiscal interests of the
fund are hardly the sort of democratic participation by indi-
vidual voters that GFOA seems to trumpet. Further, fund
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Even if GFOA were right that discriminatory exemp-
tion increases citizens’ participation in their own govern-
ment, it would do so at the cost of economic and political
Balkanization. One of the key weaknesses of decentral-
ized government is that the effects of individual state
projects spill over into neighboring states.21 Because there
is generally neither reward nor punishment for those
spillovers, or ‘‘externalities,’’ state government underpro-
duces positive spillovers and overproduces negative
ones. Individuals have no right to a direct voice in the
affairs of neighboring governments, whatever the effect
of spillovers.22 Cross-jurisdictional ownership of bonds,
however, offers an avenue of influence for nonvoting
neighbors to gain a say in the affairs of those who affect
them.23 Bondholders could encourage public projects that
generate positive externalities, or vice versa, enabling a
more efficient and more democratic federalism without
the need for any central government intervention.24 Dis-
criminatory exemption undermines this salutary process
by offering bondholders strong incentives to purchase
only their own state’s bonds.
A final benefit that might be claimed from exemption
is administrative convenience. The federal government
exempts state-issued municipal bonds. Therefore, to im-
pose tax on those bonds, the state must add a line to its
income tax forms directing its taxpayers to ‘‘add back’’
their income from state bonds. Exemption would elimi-
nate this modest burden. This justification fails, however,
as an explanation for discriminatory exemption. If Ken-
tucky imposes tax on interest earned on out-of-state
federally exempt bonds, it still must add a line to its
returns to direct taxpayers to add back that revenue. If
anything, exemption of some federally exempt bonds but
not others adds to the complexity of Kentucky’s tax
scheme.25
Municipal Bonds Issued by Localities
We turn now to potential justifications for state tax
exemption of municipal bonds issued by states’ political
subdivisions, rather than by states themselves.26 Here we
find the rationale for discriminatory exemption some-
what more plausible, but still paper thin on close inspec-
tion.
Like the federal exemption, state exemptions for local
bonds can be defended as a form of fiscal transfer from
higher to lower levels of government.27 Although the
state forgoes income, the local government is likely able
to borrow at a lower rate. Whether this is overall an
attractive policy choice turns on many factors, such as the
relative quality of local vs. state or federal government,
which we do not intend to canvass here.28
Assuming those transfers are desirable, exemption is
an extremely poor way to implement them. As we have
seen, because the tax exemption translates into lower
borrowing costs only imperfectly, exempt bonds generate
more cost for the transferor (state) than is received by the
transferee (political subdivision). Moreover, exemption
blunts the effects of fiscal carelessness by local govern-
ments. The amount of state money that local govern-
ments draw through the exemption increases as costs of
borrowing increase.29 Thus the state tax exemption per-
versely rewards bad credit ratings for municipal govern-
ments.
Because of those problems, exemption is an irrational
strategy for fiscal transfer. A state could easily design a
grant program that would likely capture all of the
advantages of exemption with none of the problems.
Commentators have argued that tax exemptions are an
appealing alternative to grants because they allow the
size of the fiscal transfer to vary depending on the
amount of effort exerted by the recipient.30 That is, the
investors may hail from many different jurisdictions, some with
competing interests in the use of a bond-funded project.
21See, e.g., Wallace Oates, ‘‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,’’
37 J. Econ. Lit. 1120, 1126-1127 (1999); Richard B. Stewart,
‘‘Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,’’ 86 Yale
L.J. 1196, 1215-1216 (1977).
22See Kirk J. Stark, ‘‘The Right to Vote on Taxes,’’ 96 Nw. Univ.
L. Rev. 191, 219-233 (2001) (describing the inability of citizens to
vote on taxes whose economic burden they bear but nominally
imposed by jurisdiction where citizens do not reside).
23We remain skeptical that individual bondholders will
exercise this opportunity rather than free-riding on the expected
efforts of other investors. In this paragraph, however, we accept
for the sake of argument the possibility that bondholders are
more likely than citizens at large to overcome the collective
action problems that plague voters.
24We note that this possibility offers a reason to support
section 103, the provision authorizing federally tax-exempt
municipal bonds, while opposing exemption at the state level.
The federal deduction, in this view, encourages states to select
bonds over other means of financing, a choice that leads to more
efficient provision of spillovers. In contrast, discriminatory state
exemption tends to increase the costliness, and reduce the
appeal, of state bonds relative to other financing options.
25If legal restrictions on the use of bond proceeds were a
significant constraint on state planning, then the use of the
exemption might have another potential use as a form of
precommitment device. That is, by devoting its resources to
bonds rather than general revenues, the state would be pledging
itself to spend funds only on those purposes consistent with the
legal limitations on the uses of those bonds. However, because
the legal limits at present are extremely loose, we think that this
account is unlikely to offer much reason to favor bonds. See
Robert S. Andursky and Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Debt
Finance Law: Theory and Practice 126-136 (1992) (summarizing
case law interpreting public use restrictions on municipal
bonds).
26The Davis facts do not appear to implicate, and no party has
yet raised, the question of local tax exemptions for state or local
bonds. Local income taxes are relatively rare, however.
27GFOA Br. at 20.
28We refer readers interested in those questions to Brian
Galle, ‘‘A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Feder-
alism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code,’’ 82 Ind. L.J. 673, 691-696
(2007); Clayton P. Gillette, ‘‘Fiscal Federalism and the Use of
Municipal Bond Proceeds,’’ 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030, 1058 and
n.105 (1983).
29For instance, recall that in our example in Section II, the
value of a 5 percent state exemption for an 8 percent market-rate
bond was $0.30. If, through fiscal mismanagement, a local
government now must borrow at 10 percent, the value of its 5
percent exemption becomes $0.375.
30See GFOA Br. at 20, 24; Gillette, supra note 28, at 1079-1080.
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size of the transfer increases as the locality takes on more
debt. Also, it could be argued that tax exemptions make
financial planning for local governments easier because
the municipality need not guess whether the exemption
will be budgeted each year.
As Prof. Edward Zelinsky has argued, it is straightfor-
ward to design a grant that duplicates those effects.31 For
example, a grant can be enacted as an entitlement, so that
it is automatically awarded each year. The amount of the
grant can be tied to local spending efforts, as has been
done in transfers to the Canadian provinces, as well as
domestically in many statewide education funding pro-
grams.32 Similarly, to the extent that small municipalities
face high transaction costs in issuing debt, a state-level
grant could easily overcome that obstacle.
We would add that a well-designed grant could also
largely eliminate the fiscal responsibility externality. For
instance, states might set a cap on their grant amount,
readjusted at suitable times, based on the marginal tax
rate of marginal bond buyers and the average nationwide
rate for municipal bonds of a given credit rating. In our
Kentucky hypothetical, then, Kentucky might award its
municipalities a grant of no more than 0.3 percent of their
total bond interest payments: the 5 percent marginal tax
rate times the 6 percent nationwide average for
investment-grade municipal bonds.
Even if the fiscal transfer rationale were a persuasive
account of the general exemption for locally issued
municipal bonds, Kentucky would still need some addi-
tional justification for its discriminatory exemption. A
Kentucky exemption for bonds issued by subdivisions of
every state would still enable Kentucky’s political subdi-
visions to borrow at a reduced rate from Kentucky
taxpayers. This strategy could be costly, however, in that
Kentucky would also forego revenue that would flow to
municipalities outside Kentucky.33 Thus, it appears that
the key rationale for Kentucky’s discriminatory exemp-
tion is to permit fiscal transfers to Kentucky’s political
subdivisions while economizing on the foregone tax
revenue that flows from taxing other states’ bonds.
Yet the Supreme Court has been reluctant to approve
state-imposed burdens on interstate commerce when the
sole justification offered by the state is its own fiscal
bottom line.34 And for good reason. The dormant Com-
merce Clause protects our national interests in interstate
harmony and an open, efficient economy.35 At the same
time, the Court has been reluctant to condemn state
policies that might in fact enhance overall national wel-
fare or that may simply embody a different ideal of
justice or wise policy.36 The corresponding burdens on
national interests can then be justified as the price we pay
for the opportunity to select among different local com-
munities and their policies. So state policies that serve
some avowed purpose other than simply enriching the
state are at least defensible. But we cannot see why the
Court would want to give states the power to, in effect,
award themselves grants from the pool of national
wealth as long as Congress stands occupied elsewhere.
The power to extract funding from the national pool
would generate a major fiscal externality, inducing state
and local governments to supply inefficient levels and
forms of local services.
Further, the discriminatory exemption in many ways
causes rather than cures the supposed danger of outflows
of state wealth. If every state were to enact a nondiscrimi-
natory exemption, funds would flow not only out of but
also back into Kentucky. Just as Kentucky would forego
revenue in favor of municipal bonds from Tennessee or
Ohio, so too would Ohio and Tennessee forego revenue
in favor of municipal bonds from Kentucky.37
This mutual interflow is greatly diminished because of
the enactment of discriminatory exemptions. Indeed, the
enactment of a discriminatory exemption in any state
undermines nondiscriminatory exemptions in every
state. In a pairing of any state with a discriminatory
provision and any other state without one, revenues will
flow from the nondiscriminator to the discriminator. The
only way for the nondiscriminator to stanch the flow is to
negotiate with the discriminator to change its law, or to
enact its own discrimination provision. The second op-
tion involves fewer transaction costs, and the transaction
31Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Are Tax ‘Benefits’ Constitutionally
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?’’ 112 Harv. L. Rev. 379,
401-412 (1998).
32We note that one of us has elsewhere expressed some
skepticism about the complete equivalence of tax benefits and
grants. Galle, supra note 28, at 694-695. That skepticism rested
largely on the claim that individual taxpayers may perceive
taxes as especially onerous, and therefore welcome tax cuts
more warmly than direct grants. Because municipal bonds are
traded in a thick, sophisticated market, we doubt that those
kinds of cognitive biases would affect the relative pricing of
bonds supported by exemptions or grants. But we are open to
persuasion by empirical evidence to the contrary.
33These non-Kentucky municipalities might or might not
benefit from Kentucky’s largesse, depending on whether they
were able to meet all their borrowing needs in states that
exempted their bonds from taxation.
34The Court has expressly rejected bottom-line concerns as a
justification for ‘‘discriminatory’’ state provisions subject to
heightened scrutiny. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 393 (1994). It has left open whether that rationale could
be placed on the scales in its less demanding ‘‘Pike balancing,’’
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), although a
plurality opinion in one recent decision opined that it could,
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 Sup. Ct. 1786, 1798 (2007). For our view of why that
portion of the Court’s opinion is not binding precedent, see Yale
and Galle, supra note 1, at 1042.
35Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Michigan Public Serv. Comm’n,
545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005); Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390; Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
36See, e.g., United Haulers, 127 Sup. Ct. at 1796.
37More precisely, Kentucky municipalities would never face
the danger that, if unable to sell all their bonds in Kentucky, they
would be obliged to pay a dramatically higher interest rate to
compete in other states. The exact extent of cross-state transfers
would likely vary depending on the degree to which a given
state and its residents, taken together, are a net bond buyer or
seller. The point remains that, taking interstate transfers into
account, Kentucky is overall either better off or not much worse
off under a nondiscriminatory regime.
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costs of negotiation would grow exponentially as the
number of interacting states increases. Thus, the tit-for-
tat retaliation strategy is dominant.38 That this is the same
dynamic at play in the nearly universal adoption of
discriminatory provisions is strongly implied by the
existence of provisions, such as Utah has enacted, offer-
ing mutual nondiscrimination to states that will recipro-
cate.39 It is just those interstate antagonisms that the
Commerce Clause seeks to prevent.40
In short, we see little justification either for discrimi-
natory exemption of locally issued municipal bonds or
for the exemption more generally. Indeed, we think there
is a plausible argument that it should fail even rational
basis scrutiny. Technically, however, rational basis scru-
tiny usually eschews a comparison of the policy under
consideration with other alternatives, and it is by com-
parison with grants that discriminatory exemption looks
especially pointless. However, to the extent that Pike
balancing is truly a balancing test and not simply a
recapitulation of due process/rational basis scrutiny re-
view, we think Kentucky’s scheme would have to fall.41
The possibility of elevated scrutiny also helps to
distinguish exemption of bonds at the state level from the
federal exemption granted under section 103. We agree
with earlier commentators that section 103 has many
unappealing features. But we doubt the Supreme Court
would be willing to strike it down as irrational. It follows
that any argument that state exemption is unconstitu-
tional would have to explain why Congress may do what
the states cannot.
For us the main answer is that state regulations
affecting capital markets are justifiably subject to greater
scrutiny than are similar laws enacted by Congress.42
Commerce Clause scholars have long articulated why
that should be so.43 Exemption distorts the nationwide
market for investment dollars in ways that may be
harmful to the economy as a whole. The federal govern-
ment is more to be trusted on matters crossing state
boundaries because only at the federal level are all of the
affected interests directly represented in the political
process. In contrast, absent some strong in-state political
faction whose interests happen to align with out-of-state
interests, we cannot realistically expect state actors to
internalize the harms they may cause for outsiders.44
Therefore, the extremely high deference to legislative
outcomes that rational basis scrutiny embodies is prob-
ably inappropriate for economically distortive state leg-
islation. That is even truer in this case, when the effect of
the challenged legislation is to shield state officials from
the electoral consequences of their fiscal choices. So the
state exemption should be held unconstitutional, even
while section 103 is not, because the states must be made
to answer to a higher standard.
Prognostication and Foreboding
Readers who have followed closely the recent contro-
versy over Davis have no doubt noticed that we seem
more bullish on the Davises’ chances to prevail than most
other commentators. To be clear: We think that they
should prevail and that they will prevail if the Court is
fastidious in applying its precedents, but — in the end —
we doubt they will (although we think it is a close case
and know predictions can be hazardous).
The main reason we are skeptical regarding the
Davises’ chances before the Court is that, even though we
think they have the better side of the arguments based on
both policy and precedent, in United Haulers there were
only three votes in favor of a position much like the one
we have articulated.45 The Court could easily reverse the
Kentucky Court of Appeals simply by extending the rule
of United Haulers to cover Davis.
We think extending United Haulers to Davis would be
risky for the Court given the law of unintended conse-
quences. Perhaps the most obvious way to extend United
Haulers would be to conclude that Kentucky and the
other states aren’t similarly situated — any claim of
discrimination presupposes that whatever people or
things are being compared are similar in some relevant
sense. The petitioner’s main argument before the Court is
that Kentucky and other states that issue municipal
bonds aren’t similarly situated. It is of course true, as the
petitioner argues, that there is only one Kentucky — and
thus the use of the proceeds of Kentucky municipal bond
sales and the revenue sources for the repayment of those
bonds are wholly unique. But the appropriate question,
we think, is whether Kentucky’s bonds, when evaluated
as an investment, are similar to the bonds issued by other
states. The Court’s most detailed explication regarding
what makes entities ‘‘similarly situated’’ for dormant
Commerce Clause purposes is whether they compete
against one another in the marketplace.46
The ‘‘dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and
participants in markets,’’47 that is, it protects the efficient
functioning of the interstate market for investment capi-
tal and investors like the respondents. The Kentucky tax
38See Jim Rossi, ‘‘Political Bargaining and Judicial Interven-
tion in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism,’’ 83 Wash. U. L.
Q. 5231, 538 (2005); cf. James R. Rogers, ‘‘The Effectiveness and
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentive Policies for Locating
Business: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis,’’ 53 Tax Law. 431
(1999) (describing game theory approach to state tax setting).
39See Pet. for Cert. at 7-8, Kentucky v. Davis, No. 06-666, filed
Nov. 9, 2006.
40H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 529, 539 (1939).
41Admittedly, however, we are not aware of a prior case in
which the Court has applied Pike balancing to a state tax
provision.
42We offer an additional distinction in note 24 supra.
43See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. and John Ferejohn, ‘‘The
Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Fed-
eralism,’’ 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1355, 1362-1364 (1994); Julian N. Eule,
‘‘Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,’’ 91 Yale L.J.
425, 430 (1982); Mark Tushnet, ‘‘Rethinking the Dormant Com-
merce Clause,’’ 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125, 130-133.
44Daniel Shaviro, ‘‘An Economic and Political Look at Fed-
eralism in Taxation,’’ 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 931-934 (1992).
45United Haulers, 127 Sup. Ct. 1786 (2007). Further, we think
the Court may seek to avoid the difficult remedial question that
would arise if it affirms. See Yale and Galle, supra note 1, at
1041-1042 n.44; NFMA Br. at 21-29.
46General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1996).
47Id. at 300.
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law at issue treats otherwise identically situated Kentuck-
ians differently based only on the identity of the issuer of
the municipal bonds they hold. The idea that Kentucky
bonds and bonds of sister states aren’t competing alter-
natives — in other words, the idea that they aren’t similar
in the constitutionally relevant sense — strikes us as
incredible. If the Court accepts Kentucky’s argument that
its bonds are not similar in the constitutionally relevant
sense to the municipal bonds issued by other states, the
Court might be plunging dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine into a new realm of indeterminacy. Future courts
and litigants in dormant Commerce Clause cases will
have to grapple with defining market boundaries and
assessing the presence and intensity of competition be-
tween different entities and the products and services
they sell.48
Another approach to extending United Haulers to fit
the facts of Davis would be to acknowledge the self-
evident fact that municipal bonds and the states that
issue them are essentially similar to each other, but to
conclude nonetheless that states are free to discriminate
in their own (and in their political subdivisions’) favor.49
The logic for such an approach has already been at least
partially worked out in the context of the market partici-
pation doctrine case law and, to a greater degree, in
academic commentary on the principles that underlie
that doctrine.50 The difficulty, however, as we have
previously explained, is that the court has refused to
extend the market participation doctrine protection to
regulatory market interventions, including tax laws.
Thus if the Court decides the case on this basis, it will
solidify that part of United Haulers establishing the ability
of states to discriminate with impunity against out-of-
state interests. Although the United Haulers Court was
content that states wouldn’t start to open up for-profit
businesses that are able to compete on favorable terms
against out-of-state commercial interests,51 we’re not so
confident.
The Court mollified itself on this point by hypothesiz-
ing that ‘‘major in-state interests adversely affected by’’
such state participation would be a safeguard against
abuse.52 But what happens when states and local private
businesses join together in cooperative ventures to take
on out-of-state competitors? Just such a cooperative
venture was at issue in C&A Carbone,53 and the court
decided the facility was private because a private entity
held title to the facility, even though the benefits and
burdens of ownership were, in reality, held by the
municipality. Apparently the case would have come out
differently if a state organ held title, even if the facility
continued to be operated by the private firm as a
subcontractor. If this is right, then far from acting as a
political check on the state, local businesses will be lining
up to do business with the state and its subdivisions so
they too can gain the benefits of the state’s privileged
status (through sale-leaseback arrangements or some
other formal contrivance designed to qualify discrimina-
tory regulations favoring their co-venture with the puta-
tive state-business dormant Commerce Clause
exemption). As long as all significant local business is
part of the cartel, there is no real in-state political check.
Concluding Remarks
There are still more doctrinal maneuvers the Court
could use to reverse the lower court’s decision in Davis
and preserve the status quo in the municipal debt mar-
ket. In the end, we believe the question is closer than
others say, not only for the many reasons we have offered
here and in our earlier report, but also because of our
reading of the justices’ deeper philosophical commit-
ments. Justices Souter and Ginsburg were in the majority
in United Haulers. Yet to judge by their past writing, both
are strongly committed to the notion that genuine de-
mocracy requires that states be held to account for
decisions that undermine the national interest, even
when — indeed, especially when — that accountability
comes at a price to the state treasury those officials watch
over.54
48To a limited extent, this problem might already have
begun. Smith v. N.H. Dep’t of Rev. Admin., 813 A.2d 372, 379
(N.H. 2002). Issues of this sort are among the most vexing in all
of antitrust law.United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391-392 (1956). Emphasizing those issues in dormant
Commerce Clause adjudication would preclude many future
suits, given the difficulty and expense of proving that similar
products are substitutes. It would also be inconsistent with past
decisions such as Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1983), in which the Court found that even incidental competi-
tion between in-state and out-of-state products was sufficient to
condemn a discriminatory law.
49We are not sure whether the record shows that the Davises
owned only state bonds, only bonds issued by political subdi-
visions, or some of each. If the Davises owned only bonds
falling into one of those categories, the Court could avoid
addressing the others, although we would regard this as a lost
opportunity to settle the issued once and for all.
50See Yale and Galle, supra note 1, at 1040-1041 notes 32-43
(collecting citations).
51127 Sup. Ct. at 1797 n.7.
52Id.
53C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
54See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 799-804 (1999) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
119-120, 153-159, 169-170 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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